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O

n the morning of 9/11, Americans across the country witnessed al Qaeda’s
terrorist attacks as appalling images that provoked shock at the slaughter,
grief for the victims, and furor toward the perpetrators. Islamist radicals had succeeded in striking an intensely visceral blow. Even though the destruction was
great, it once again became brutally clear that the power of terrorist violence
derives not primarily from the physical damages it inflicts, but from the states of
mind it provokes. This realization dominates our definitions of terrorism, which
usually stress its intention to achieve victory by engendering fear. American
reactions to 9/11, however, illustrate that we need to recognize the centrality of
another emotion—outrage. While accepting the importance of fear in terrorist schemes, this article insists that to understand the dynamics of terrorism we
should also grant that many of its most important gains come not by instilling fear
but by inciting outrage.
The reinterpretation offered in these pages grew out of teaching the
history of terrorism in university classrooms for almost a decade. It begins
by reexamining some of the basics—the definition, diversity, and dynamics
of terrorism—to arrive at a better understanding of the ways in which actions
of relatively few terrorists can generate such intense moral outrage. As an
example of the tactical manipulation of such outrage, the focus shifts briefly to
the efforts of the Provisional IRA to provoke a violent overreaction by British
troops on Bloody Sunday in 1972 and to benefit from the fatal shots the soldiers
fired that day. The article then presents testimony supporting the hypotheses
that 9/11 was meant to be similarly provocative and that al Qaeda succeeded by
drawing the United States into an ill-considered war in Iraq. The article finally
hazards the opinion that war ensued not simply because of the mind-set of the
Bush administration but also because of the unsatisfied wrath of the American
people. Yet as in the case with so many journeys, the greater value of this
intellectual expedition comes not from reaching its end point but in what it
discovers along the way.
After retiring from the University of Illinois, John Lynn moved to Northwestern
University as Distinguished Professor of Military History. In 1994-95, he served as
Oppenheimer Professor of Warfighting Strategy at Marine Corps University. While he
has published extensively on early modern European war and military institutions. He is
currently writing a book on the history of terrorism for Yale University Press.
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Defining Terrorism in Terms of Fear
Common definitions of terrorism almost always stress fear. The noted
authority Bruce Hoffman, in his Inside Terrorism, exemplifies this: “We may . . .
define terrorism as the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change . . . . It is meant to
instill fear within, and thereby intimidate, a wider ‘target audience.”1 James M.
Poland echoes the same emphasis in his much-read, Understanding Terrorism:
“Terrorism is the premeditated, deliberate, systematic murder, mayhem, and
threatening of the innocent to create fear and intimidation in order to gain a
political or tactical advantage, usually to influence an audience.”2 Official
definitions repeat this formula; the current Department of Defense Dictionary
of Military and Associated Terms, as amended to 15 February 2012, defines
terrorism as: “The unlawful use of violence or threat of violence to instill fear
and coerce governments or societies. Terrorism is often motivated by religious,
political, or other ideological beliefs and committed in the pursuit of goals that
are usually political.”3
Without denying the coercive force of fear, it is still critical to realize
that, within the context of those forms of terrorism that most concern the United
States today, outrage can be a more important consequence of terrorist acts. The
parameters of this article do not allow a full examination of the complex relationship between fear and outrage; certainly the same action can lead to either
reaction, and fear can be an element in stimulating outrage. It may be best to
consider them as opposite poles along a continuum of response. Simply put, fear
has more to do with paralysis than with assertion, and the measures it promotes
are mainly protective and defensive; the terrorist engenders fear in the hopes
of compelling compliance. Importantly, all three of the authoritative definitions
of terrorism just presented link fear with intimidation. In contrast, outrage
inspires retaliation, and importantly, that retaliation is seen as righteous, as will
be argued below. While fear is uncomfortable, outrage is in some ways its own
reward, because the actions it incites can serve as emotional and moral release.
For those who are quick to believe that the terrorists’ primary goal is to
paralyze their victims with fear, reprisals born of outrage can be dangerously
seductive. On a superficial level, it might seem that Americans could defeat
the terrorist enemy simply by not showing fear, and what better way to demonstrate resolute resistance than by defiant words and aggressive blows? Among
American reactions to 9/11, popular culture took on an assertive bravado. It
showed up from lapel pins to banners, and in our music. Not surprisingly, the
traditionally patriotic medium of country music was particularly overt. Toby
Keith threatened in Courtesy of the Red, White, and Blue: “Hey, Uncle Sam
put your name at the top of his list, And the Statue of Liberty started shaking
her fist. And the eagle will fly and it’s gonna be hell, When you hear Mother
Freedom start ringing her bell. And it’ll feel like the whole wide world is raining
down on you.” In Have You Forgotten, Darryl Worley declared, “Some say
this country’s just out looking for a fight, Well, after 9/11 man I’d have to say
that’s right.” The chorus demanding sharp-edged responses could also be heard
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far outside Nashville. Neil Young, that icon of the counterculture that rejected
American involvement in Vietnam, offered up Let’s Roll, “You’ve got to turn on
evil, When it’s coming after you, You’ve gotta face it down, And when it tries
to hide, You’ve gotta go in after it, And never be denied.”
The revenge advocated was not to be a dish served cold, but one fired
by the heat of outrage. After 9/11, American desire for vengeance was certainly
understandable and entirely consistent with theories of social psychology that
stress the appeal of us-versus-them rhetoric and action at such times of extreme
challenge.4 Nonetheless, rash retaliation can be self-defeating, and astute terrorists not only know this, they count on it.

The Diversity and Unity of Terrorism
Understanding the relative roles of fear and outrage requires taking into
consideration three fundamentals of terrorism: the great variety of its forms;
the contrasting dynamics of strength and weakness within this diversity; and
the defining moral transgression that gives unity to terrorism’s many avatars.
Like “cancer,” “terrorism” is an umbrella term for a number of related
but still quite distinct maladies. In university-based classes on the history of
terrorism, this author distinguishes between at least sixteen general categories
of terrorism.5 These include such diverse forms as:
•• Tactics employed by powerful regimes to intimidate their own populations.
•• Abuses committed by majority ethnic populations against vulnerable
minorities to subjugate them or drive them away.
•• Strategies of small bands of violent radicals who attack established governments in the name of separatist or Marxist goals.
•• Attacks perpetrated by clusters of millenarian Islamists hoping to humiliate the United States and usher in a new caliphate.
In stressing the considerable diversity of terrorism, the approach runs counter
to those authorities who caution that overly inclusive definitions of terrorism become useless.6 While restricting the phenomenon included under the
umbrella of terrorism may be necessary for legal and diplomatic purposes, a
broader approach promises a more fundamental understanding of terrorism.
Some forms of terrorism are the actions of the strong against the weak,
while others reverse this relationship, changing the goals and impact of terrorist
acts. Most textbooks inform their readers that the word “terror” made its first
political appearance as the “Reign of Terror” during the height of the French
Revolution, when terror was meant to compel conformity to a particular vision
of revolutionary virtue. Maximillian Robespierre explained: “If the mainspring
of popular government in peacetime is virtue, the mainspring of popular government in revolution is virtue and terror both: virtue, without which terror is
disastrous; terror, without which virtue is powerless.”7 Stalin employed this
kind of terror on a far larger scale to silence opposition during his purges. When
the state terrorizes its own people, the dynamic is that of the strong against the
weak, and the goal of this terror is, indeed, to foster compliance through fear.
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Al Qaeda’s actions against the United States, however, represent a very
different kind of terrorism, that of the weak against the strong. Few in number
and limited in resources, al Qaeda and its affiliates have struck the most powerful
country on earth. When counterterrorist intelligence discovers the membership
and assets of terrorist groups, it is generally shocking how few individuals are
actually engaged in violence. Estimates concerning the Red Brigades in Italy and
the Red Army Faction in Germany during the 1970s, for example, reveal only
handfuls of shooters and bombers.8 Even isolated terrorists can do great damage.
As we will discuss, terrorist attacks by the weak are often intended to strengthen
their movement as much or more than they are meant to harm the enemy.
One challenge, and reward, in accepting the full variety of terrorism is
the consequent search for and identification of a defining unity within that diversity. This unity cannot be found in its causes or goals, but it exists in the morality
of its methods, which, from the victim’s point of view, stand outside the ethical
universe of “proper” war. War is supposed to be a contest between two or more
armed parties, all able to deal out death and destruction to the other. In such a
conflict, acts of violence are legitimate as acts of self-defense. At its most basic,
it is kill or be killed. But terrorism targets those unable or unprepared to defend
themselves. Some authorities on terrorism express this truth stating that terrorists attack civilians, not troops. But that is too restrictive, since the Marines in
their Beruit barracks or the airmen in Khobar Towers also deserve to be counted
as victims of terrorism.
Rather than gaining praise as acts of valor in deadly combat, attacks on
the defenseless are condemned as evil murder. Here is the unity of terrorism, and
this unity inspires the moral outrage that concerns us in the article. The constant
use of the word “evil” by the Bush administration to describe 9/11 exemplifies
this indignation; between September 2001 and March 2002, the president explicitly referred to evil 199 times in foreign policy speeches.9 he minced no words:
“Osama bin Laden is an evil man. His heart has been so corrupted that he’s willing
to take innocent life. And we are fighting evil, and we will continue to fight evil,
and we will not stop until we defeat evil.”10

Making Weak Terrorists Stronger through the Help of their Victims
The terrorists who have so troubled the world since the 1960s, as different as the nationalist IRA and the Islamist al Qaeda, have perpetrated a terrorism
of the weak against the strong, in which they have sought to employ the wrath of
their victims to mobilize more supporters to the cause of the terrorists. They have
been able to do so by what Daniel Fromkin calls “a sort of jujitsu,” the “ingenuity” of which consists of “using an opponent’s own strength against him.”11 As
Fromkin pointed out, the path toward multiplying the number, resources, and
power of terrorism lies in provoking the adversary’s outrage so that he will use
his strength to do something that is essentially self-defeating. If effective, the
terrorists turn their adversaries into agents of the terrorists’ will.
This jujitsu results from another fundamental of terrorism: it is political
theater that plays to several audiences. One problem with many definitions of
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terrorism, such as the three presented previously, is that they are written by and
for the audience of victims. Terrorists also play to those whose support they
already enjoy or hope to win over.12 Should terrorists recruit the uncommitted, they can raise the conflict to a higher, more intense level. Terrorism can be
considered an entry level of war, requiring even fewer resources and combatants than a guerrilla campaign. To the degree that terrorists hope to escalate
the fighting, they need to increase their assets. In the case of national-based
terrorists, this could allow them to advance to a full insurgency and, ultimately,
a triumphal conventional stage, as described by Mao Zedong. Ariel Merari, the
head of the Center for Political Violence at Tel Aviv University, puts it succinctly:
“One might say that all terrorist groups want to be guerrillas when they grow
up.”13 In the case of a terrorist with a global horizon, more resources promise a
broader reach.
The IRA, or more accurately the Provisional IRA, or Provos, applied
this deadly terrorist jujitsu in Northern Ireland. Consider the most iconic event
of “The Troubles”: Bloody Sunday, 30 January 1972, when British troops fired
on unarmed civil rights demonstrators in Derry, killing thirteen and wounding
an equal number. This deadly event had been preceded by a long campaign of
attacks by the Provos against the British Army in Derry. Between August and
mid-December 1971, the Provos fired nearly 2,000 rounds at British troops,
killing seven soldiers.14 A former Provo, Sean O’Hara, explained the callous
strategy of provocation:
Things have always been manipulated, always. In 1971, . . . for
six weeks or possibly two months every single night we were out
agitating, we were out throwing petrol bombs, nail bombs, we were
stirring, we were really putting the Army under pressure … But we
knew the situation was going to happen, right? If we provoked them
enough, if we attacked them enough, at some point it wasn’t just us
they were going to be shooting at, it was the people . . . . There was
a difference between somebody getting shot in a gun battle and some
innocent people getting shot in the streets. And we knew the situation
had to come [in order] to escalate the war. That they had to shoot
civilians and we knew that. And we agitated and agitated until we got
to that situation.
We had to move the violence to a new level, right? And the only way
that we could do that was causing thems [sic] to commit the outrageous, to shoot innocent civilians. But this was inevitable because
if you are going out and there’s riots going on and some people are
throwing stones and they’re throwing bombs, at the end of the day
they are going to retaliate. As soon as they shoot somebody, you cry,
‘Foul, they are shooting innocent people.’ Which, in a sense they
were, but the situation was engineered.15

The Provos were weak in numbers, and in order to “move the violence to a new level,” O’Hara explains, “[they] needed the whole situation to
be escalated. The thing was always planned.” And the Provos succeeded. One
of their leaders testified: “Bloody Sunday was a turning point. Whatever lingering chance had existed for change through constitutional means vanished.

Spring 2012

55

John A. Lynn II

Recruitment to the IRA rocketed as a result. Events that day probably led more
young nationalists to join the Provisionals than any other single action by the
British.”16 One incensed partisan explained: “It was only on Bloody Sunday
that I thought . . . we got to meet violence with violence here, even if I am going
to be killed on the streets. Bloody Sunday is a . . . defining moment for the IRA
because like after Bloody Sunday they had complete legitimacy, before Bloody
Sunday they didn’t have any at all.”17

Al Qaeda, Afghanistan, and Iraq
The interplay of terrorists with their multiple audiences is certainly relevant in analyzing the terrorism that most concerns Americans today—that of
violent Islamist extremists directed against the United States—above all by the
events of 9/11.
In 1996 and 1998, Osama bin Laden issued a call to target America
because it was supporting Israel against the Palestinians, stationing troops
within the sacred land of Saudi Arabia, and conducting a campaign designed
to humiliate and kill Muslims. In bin Laden’s narrative, the United States was
engaged in a war against Islam.18 To the degree that the body of Muslim believers, the Ummah, accept this narrative, the Ummah may accept al Qaeda attacks
as justified, or even as moral imperatives, because jihad is required in defence
of Islam. In order to gain support for al Qaeda and its goals, bin Laden had to
win over the audience of disaffected Muslims.
Did bin Laden design the 9/11 attacks to advance the narrative and
gain supporters for Islamist extremists by provoking US reprisals? Was the
invasion of Afghanistan and the later invasion of Iraq an American “Bloody
Sunday”? The answer to this remains a matter of debate. In the most recent
authoritative book tracing the war on terror, The Longest War: The Enduring
Conflict between America and al-Qaeda (2011), author Peter Bergen dismisses
any assertion that bin Laden was trying to use terrorist jujitsu on America.19
Bergen insists that bin Laden was convinced America was so weak-willed that
the 9/11 attacks would serve as a kind of magnified “Black Hawk Down,” inducing the Americans to retreat from meddling in Middle Eastern affairs, just as
we withdrew from Somalia.
But in The Longest War, Bergen presents little if any hard evidence
to make his case, and there is important testimony to the contrary. In a 1996
interview conducted by journalist Abdule Bari Atwan in Tora Bora, bin Laden
announced, “We want to bring the Americans to fight us on Muslim land. If we
can fight them on our own territory we will beat them, because the battle will
be on our terms in a land they neither know nor understand.”20 In discussing the
October 2000 attack on the U.S.S. Cole, the 9/11 Commission Report referred
to evidence that bin Laden expected and desired US retaliation. The report concluded: “According to the source, bin Laden wanted the United States to attack,
and if it did not, he would launch something bigger.”21 Ahmed Zaidan, Pakistan
correspondent for Al Jazeera, spoke to bin Laden’s lieutenant, Mohammed
Atef, in February 2001, when Atef described al Qaeda strategy:
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He was explaining to me what’s going to happen in the coming five
years . . . . There are two or three places in the world which [are]
the most suitable places to fight Americans: Afghanistan, Iraq, and
Somalia. We are expecting the United States to invade Afghanistan.
And we are preparing for that. We want them to come to Afghanistan.”22

In addition, the notion that particularly strong American reprisals were
not a consideration seems to run counter to Bergen’s own reports that in 2000
the United States warned the Taliban about dire consequences for Afghanistan
should al Qaeda attack again, a warning that the Taliban took so seriously that
their leader, Mullah Omar, even asked bin Laden to leave Afghanistan.23 In the
face of these facts, it is impossible to dismiss the strong possibility that bin Laden
expected the United States would bog down in Afghanistan just as the Russians
had, producing similar results. A man like bin Laden was bound to trust the
history of the anti-Russian jihad, 1979-88, and the intervention of Allah.
Admittedly, the jury is still out; perhaps the documents found at bin
Laden’s refuge in Abbottabad may shed more light on the issue. Yet even if
Bergen is correct in his insistence that bin Laden miscalculated the reprisals
that 9/11 might provoke, that fact alone would not invalidate emphasizing the
role of outrage in the events that followed. While astute terrorists factor in the
provocative character of their acts, it is circumstance and not intentions that
determine the degree to which wrath intervenes. And, as Clausewitz warns, the
consequences of violent action in war defy exact prediction.
In hindsight, American commitment to the overthrow of the Taliban in
Afghanistan after 9/11 seems both inevitable and justified. But the invasion of
Iraq in 2003 was neither inevitable, nor was it probably necessary, and it certainly was poorly conceived and planned, at least beyond the defeat of Saddam
Hussein’s conventional forces. It is not the point here to advance a theory as to
why the Bush administration pushed for war, but it is very much to the point to
ponder the degree to which American popular outrage facilitated the coming of
the war. Frankly, it can be argued that many Americans accepted the administration’s argument for the invasion of Iraq because they wanted to strike out against
somebody. The United States had taken down the Taliban in Afghanistan but
failed to bag bin Laden. The president resonated with much of the population
when he offered the American people another way to vent the wrath expressed
by post 9/11 popular culture, as in the songs quoted earlier in this article.
The president’s claim that Saddam Hussein was linked to the 9/11 attack
was what Americans wanted to hear; a 13 September 2001 Time/CNN poll
revealed that a surprising 78 percent of those polled suspected Saddam to be in
some way responsible for 9/11.24 In March 2003, initial enthusiasm for the war
was strong, 72 percent pro and only 22 percent con.25 In fact, this correlates with
continued belief that the Iraqi dictator bore responsibility for the attacks on the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon. A Washington Post poll published on 6
September 2003 reported that 69 percent of those polled still believed that it was
“at least likely that Hussein was involved.”26 Americans were determined to get
back at bin Laden, and Saddam made a convenient proxy.

Spring 2012

57

John A. Lynn II

As it turned out, the invasion of Iraq and the armed occupation that
followed worked to the advantage of al Qaeda through 2006. The International
Institute for Strategic Studies reported in 2004 that the invasion of Iraq proved
a great boon to al Qaeda recruitment and fundraising.27 American actions
provided recruiting tools, among them the horrific treatment of prisoners at
Abu Ghraib, a scandal that began to break in early 2004. Troubles in Fallujah,
from the shootings of civilian demonstrators in April 2003 through the first
major American offensive there a year later alienated the Sunni community.
Lieutenant General Sanchez, then commanding in Iraq, saw that offensive
as a critical watershed: “To say that the Fallujah offensive angered the Sunni
Muslims of Iraq would be a gross understatement . . . . [The] Sunni triangle
exploded with violence.”28 In September 2004, the outspoken British diplomat,
Ivor Roberts, accused President Bush of being “the best recruiting sergeant
ever for al-Qaida.”29 The hard fighting in Fallujah again in November 2004 can
be seen as adding support to this.

Muslim Opinion and Radicalization
And in a broader sense, American actions in Afghanistan and Iraq
ultimately supported the al Qaeda narrative of a Western war against Islam.
Scholars of Middle East terrorism, such as Mary Habeck in her Know the Enemy,
emphasize the arguments of present-day jihadists, which can be traced back at
least to the thirteenth-century writings of Taqi ad-Din Ahmad ibn Taymiyyah.30
Habeck and others report that violent Islamists wish for a return to fundamentalist Islam, frown on democracy because it replaces divine Sharia law with the
profane laws of men, and believe that the West is waging a war against Islam.
Thankfully, real world Muslim opinion differs from Islamic convictions
in important ways, as demonstrated by John L. Esposito and Dalia Mogahed
in their Who Speaks for Islam, which is based on extensive Gallup polling data
from Ummah around the world. For example, popular attitudes are much more
favorable toward democracy, human rights, and opportunities for women.31 The
events of the Arab Spring lend weight to these findings. Nonetheless, the polling
data is very sobering regarding Muslim perceptions of Western prejudice.
When polled as to what they resented most about the West, the respondents put
the following three factors at the top of the list:
•• Sexual and cultural promiscuity.
•• Ethical and moral corruption.
•• Hatred of Muslims.32
Esposito and Mogahed also report a far less scientific example, the typical comments of a mini-van driver in Cairo: “America hates Islam; look at what they
did to Iraq.”33 The notion of an American-led Western war against Islam has
purchase among the Ummah.
In his studies of modern Islamist terrorism, the highly regarded scholar
Marc Sagemen also stressed the importance of a belief that the West is attacking
Islam. He defines “radicalization” as the “process of transforming individuals
from rather unexceptional and ordinary beings into terrorists with the willingness
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to use violence for political ends.” This process includes four prongs, the first two
of which are a sense of moral outrage at apparent crimes against Muslims both
globally and locally and the belief that this moral violation is part of a larger war
against Islam.34 The third is beliefs resonate with personal experience, including
what one learns from observation, word of mouth, and news. Therefore, when the
United States provides evidence that the Ummah can interpret as demonstrating
the existence of a war against Islam, we are aiding the process of radicalization.
The polling and research presented by Esposito, Mogahed, and
Sageman leads one to question how central formal Islamist theology and theory
is to Islamist terrorism. It would appear what matters most is the strong belief
that Muslims have been grievously wronged, either globally or in particular
countries. Sageman concludes that jahadist operatives in the West, “were not
intellectuals or ideologues, much less religious scholars. It is not about how they
think, but how they feel.”35
Studies of suicide bombing conducted by Robert Pape contribute even
more to this conclusion. His work indicates that such extreme acts of terror
arise in resistance to the occupation of Muslim lands rather than because of
the flowering of religious extremism. Pape argues: “More than 95 percent of
all suicide attacks are in response to foreign occupation, according to extensive
research that we conducted at the University of Chicago’s Project on Security
and Terrorism, where we examined every one of the over 2,200 suicide attacks
across the world from 1980 to the present day.” He concludes, “occupations
in the Muslim world don’t make Americans any safer—in fact, they are at
the heart of the problem.”36 One must recognize that occupations of particular
Muslim countries also feed the narrative of a global war against Islam.

The Need to Do Something and Its Cost
Even though there is good reason now to question the wisdom of our
invasion of Iraq, it is far from certain that things would have been a great deal
different if wiser counsel had received more attention. This article hypothesizes
that outrage, which insists on aggressive retaliation, demanded that we had to
do something, perhaps anything, in order to gain the seductive satisfaction that
the United States had punished evil terrorists for their sins. Our attacks aimed
at the Taliban and, especially, at Saddam Hussein’s regime ultimately fed the
Islamist narrative, strengthening those feelings of abuse that served to radicalize
jihadists. Fear, the reaction by which most observers define terrorism, certainly
accounted for many actions in the United States after 9/11, such as increased
airport security and the passage of the Uniting (and) Strengthening America (by)
Providing Appropriate Tools Required (to) Intercept (and) Obstruct Terrorism
Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act). But it is outrage that played a more important
role in shaping American actions abroad.
Once engaged, the violence born of outrage has a way of perpetuating
itself through the logic of loss. In military history, the influence of casualties
and cost operate differently as time passes. At first, losses justify further
investment. Abraham Lincoln expressed this eloquently in his Gettysburg
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Address: “It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining
before us—that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that
cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion—that we here
highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain.” With less eloquence, but equal sincerity, President George W. Bush addressed veterans
in Salt Lake City in 2004 concerning the ongoing Iraq war, “We owe them
something. We will finish the task that they gave their lives for.”37 Only with
time and the realization that additional losses only increase the toll rather
than give it meaning, does attrition wear down the will to fight. Outrage and
anger fade, fear and exhaustion take their places.
This article is not intended as a criticism of the past, but as an attempt to
extract from it some guidance for the future. As argued here, terrorism encompasses several categories of violence and intimidation, not simply the radical
Islamist attacks that so concern us now. The multiple avatars of terrorism
include actions by the strong directed against the weak and by the weak against
the strong, and this contrast in dynamics can generate misconceptions concerning the terrorists’ goals of instilling fear and inciting outrage. Those who want
to defeat terrorism, but are confused as to its dynamics and goals, run the risk
of pouring gasoline rather than water on menacing fires. Such cautions matter
so much because terrorism constitutes the form of warfare with the lowest and
most easily crossed threshold; therefore, it is a malevolent genie that will not
quickly go back into the bottle when it is so often summoned to serve such a
great spectrum of causes. Within this spectrum, when terrorists who are weak
in numbers and resources wish to expand their reach or escalate their struggle,
they will engage in acts of terrorism calculated to provoke self-defeating retaliation by the strong. The astute terrorist recognizes that his victims’ outrage
furnishes him with the leverage needed to throw his enemies off balance. This
warning needs to be taken to heart by the military, but it also needs to be heard
by policymakers and populations so eager for retaliation that they are tempted
to be ruled by gut impulse rather than thoughtful calculations. In countering
terrorist jujitsu, agility and intelligence matter far more than muscle.
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